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GAMAL ABDEL NASSER AND ARAB UNIFICATION

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A Thesis  
Presented to  
the Faculty of the Department of Social Studies  
Appalachian State Teachers College

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In Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Arts

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by  
David Suleiman  
May, 1963

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by

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## PREFACE

In gratitude that they were willing to sacrifice from their time, and because they were interested in making this thesis possible, I wish to express my appreciation to Dr. Julian C. Yoder, Chairman of the Department of Social Studies at Appalachian State Teachers College; Dr. Cratis Williams, Director of Graduate Studies; and the typist, Mrs. Margaret Wagoner, who showed an equal amount of skill and enthusiasm. I especially appreciate the assistance of Mrs. Allie A. Hodgin who helped me to obtain books and manuscripts from various places, and of my adviser, Dr. Max Dixon, who, as a friend, teacher, and critic, guided the development of this study.

Many others have helped in obtaining material and information, and still others helped by listening and serving as unofficial advisers. I only regret that I cannot name all of those who have contributed to this study.

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## ABSTRACT

The concept of Arab unity has ceased to be a matter of dreams for the Arab people and has taken its place in the last few years among the issues and questions of practical politics. Since the early part of the twentieth century, the Arabs have undertaken several attempts toward unity. Nationalism and unity shadowed each other through all the frustrations, failures, and abortive attempts. Nevertheless, since the coming of Gamal Abdel Nasser to the Arab political scene, Arab hopes for unity became brighter than ever.

This study has followed the story of Arab unity from its early stages under the leadership of Sherif Hussein of Mecca, during the period of World War I, to the more successful multi-Arab-nation union under the leadership of Nasser during the period of the cold war. Although the Arabs in the past were never too hesitant in blaming all of their troubles on the "imperialists," Nasser was able to stress another weakness which was lacking in Arab thinking--the corruption of Arab leaders themselves.

Gamal Abdel Nasser knows his history and his geopolitics. Stressing the deep threads that bind Arab nationalism, President Nasser has been able to exploit the effects of the cold war and use East-West tensions to his



favor. Under his leadership, Arab unity took many strides forward. Nationalism, as viewed from Cairo, was identified with progress. Thus, by reminding the Arabs of their past heritage, and by introducing land and industrial reforms, Nasser was able to give a new image to the ideas of Arab unity. No Arab wanted to be identified with backwardness and ignorance. Nasser's supporters, for obvious psychological reasons, support his views toward Arab unity simply because they do not wish to be identified with the "reactionary" regimes that in the past have meant ignorance, poverty, and foreign control.

Nasser's plan for Arab unity is based on a well-organized scheme; yet the outline of this scheme is simple. Nasser plans to transform Egypt into a model Arab state--one that will combine domestic reforms with international prestige. Nasser made many mistakes in the past, especially as was seen in the case of the first union with Syria; but Nasser also made many bold decisions that strengthened his hand. One has only to mention the nationalization of the Suez Canal as an example.

Time is on Nasser's side. Development toward the final act of Arab unification were taking place even while the thesis was being prepared. Both Syria and Iraq, under pro-Nasser leadership, joined Egypt in a tri-nation, United

Arab Republic. The desire to become a member of this newly created republic was evident in other Arab capitals, especially in Jordan. If Nasser is unable to achieve his goal for final Arab unity during his lifetime, then it would seem that he will some day go down in history as the man who contributed most to Arab unification.



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## INTRODUCTION

The Arab world is perhaps one of the most confusing geographical areas on the earth. Usually considered by students of current history as the region of the Middle East, the Arab states cover a prodigious territory stretching from North Africa to the borders of Russia. Among the Arab states are Libya, Egypt, Algeria, the Sudan in North Africa; Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Pakistan in Southwest Asia. On the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf one finds the small sheikdoms of Kuwait, Qatan, Aden, and Oman.<sup>1</sup>

Since this study deals with the Arabs of the Middle East and their attempts toward unification, it is therefore necessary to define two terms as used in this introductory chapter. Although the two terms "Arab unity" and "Arab nation" may have various meanings to different scholars at different times, the definitions given here should be considered only as a preliminary effort to avoid confusion.

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<sup>1</sup>S. Shepard Jones, America's Role in the Middle East (Riner Forest, Illinois: Laidlaw Brothers Publishers, 1961), p. 5.

When the writer refers to "Arab unity" in this study, he does not mean a political form of unity with a central government. It is true that Turkey had a central government over the Arab states, yet there was no unity experienced by all of the Arab people under Arab leadership. Thus unification to the Arab states in this study pointed at an attempt to unite the Arab people under the leadership of Arab men, with basic Arab goals achieved in unison.

Moreover, when the introductory pages refer to an "Arab nation" during the nineteenth century, the reference is made only to identify the Arab people who were living in the Turkish vilayats (districts), and to distinguish the Arabs from the other nationalities that were under Turkish dominion.

As the study progressed, attempts were made to identify more clearly the meaning of Arab unification. Also, a section was devoted to the sole purpose of identifying the Arab and the Arab nation. Since the whole paper is centered around the new attempts toward Arab unity, it must again be emphasized that the above definitions must be kept in mind only during the reading of the introductory passages.

Several good studies have been made in the past which followed the attempts of various Arab movements toward unification. Consequently, it was not the purpose of this



study to duplicate any study that was made concerning the Arabs and their desire for unity. Nevertheless, it was the aim of this paper to take up the story of Arab nationalism and Arab unity from the point where the other studies stopped, that is, to follow the movement which is now underway under the leadership of President Nasser of Egypt.

While this study did concentrate upon the more recent movements toward unity, the writer felt that four previous studies by recognized scholars in their field should be mentioned here as excellent literature on the beginnings and early activities of Arab nationalism.

No student of Arab history and Arab political and national movement should ignore the famous book written in 1939 by George Antonius,<sup>2</sup> The Arab Awakening, which gives a comprehensive description of early attempts of Arab leaders to unify their states.

Three other books deserve to be mentioned in this study. The first, Arab Unity,<sup>3</sup> was written in 1958 by Dr. Fayez A. Sayegh, a Christian Arab who holds a Ph.D. from

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<sup>2</sup>George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Lippincott and Company, 1939).

<sup>3</sup>Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity (New York, New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1958).

Georgetown University. The book follows the developments from the seventh century to the present. Dr. Sayegh, with full documentation, follows the hopes and frustrations that went along with the Arabs from the time that England promised an Arab unity in return for help from the various Arab states against Turkey during World War I to the two definite attempts by the Arabs themselves: the establishment of the Arab League in 1945, and the formation of political unions among five Arab states in 1958.

In 1962 Sylvia G. Haim edited a book called Arab Nationalism, An Anthology.<sup>4</sup> The book is an excellent study of events (from the latter part of the nineteenth century to 1962) dealing with the problem of Arab nationalism. It is indeed an anthology and should be read by those serious students who desire to have primary sources translated from Arabic, Persian, and French.

The final study to be mentioned here, edited by William Sands, is The Arab Nation--Path and Obstacles to Fulfillment.<sup>5</sup> It is a collection of eleven speeches made by various scholars, such as A. R. Azzam, Former Secretary

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<sup>4</sup>Sylvia G. Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism, An Anthology (Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1962).

<sup>5</sup>William Sands (ed.), The Arab Nation--Path and Obstacles to Fulfillment (Washington, D. C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961).



General, League of Arab States; S. D. Goitein, Professor of Arabic, University of Pennsylvania (his subject, "Arab Nationalism as Viewed from Israel"); and John S. Badeau, President, Near East Foundation. This collection of speeches offers digestion of views as seen by different people with different interests.

Much of the material that was used in this study was acquired from the various Arab embassies in the United States. Since special emphasis was placed upon the ambitions, projects, and ideas of Nasser, the United Arab Republic Information Center in Washington, D. C., supplied the writer with all the speeches of President Nasser through 1962. It is perhaps worthy of note here that the Library of Congress, through its Oriental Division, is able to supply to those interested in further research a wealth of Arabic literature dealing with various phases of Arabic problems. The writer was especially helped by the Oriental Division in securing a well-balanced bibliography.

Although no personal interviews were recorded in this paper, the writer did interview several Arab leaders in the United States for the purposes of limiting and defining his subject.

It is not the intent of this introduction to indulge in a promiscuous discussion of Arab achievement under the Moslem Caliphates when Islamic culture and rule were supreme. The reader is reminded that there are many books that will provide academic information on the subject which one may find on any library shelf. Nevertheless, it may be in order to question why such people, who were able to control large areas of land and many nationalities, have been unable to unite in a political organization, especially, when other peoples with less favorable conditions were able to achieve their objectives of unification.

Yet, it must be kept in mind that while the Arab states on the whole are far from a state of unification, they seem to have two powerful forces, religion and a common language,<sup>6</sup> which have in the past been major factors in the unifications accomplished by other nations. Moreover, while the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were kinder to other peoples in their hopes for unification (such as Germany, Italy, and the several states of Latin America), they looked with contempt toward Arab aspirations. While

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<sup>6</sup> Philip K. Hitti, The Near East in History (New York: D. Van Nostrand and Company, 1961), p. 427.



Europe was going through an age of enlightenment and progress, the Arabs were recalling the time when their civilization was at its zenith.

La Monte, the historian, described the progress of the Moslem lands during the eighth to tenth centuries as being higher than that of the Western Christian world of the same period. But while Germany was uniting her states, and while the Western world was going through a period of physical progress and political unity, the Arabs were being rocked with a fantastic disintegration and decay. It was the "Dark Ages" for the Arabs.

The twentieth century, however, as most scholars agree, brought about a revival in Arab lands of a desire toward unification. Although there were a few attempts by individuals to unite and preach Arab unity before the coming of the twentieth century, their efforts contributed little toward real progress. Two scholars, Francisco Gabrieli and Sylvia Haim, who have done extensive research as to the origins of the movement for Arab unity, although they disagree as to the exact time, point to the early years of the twentieth century as the real beginning.

Consequently, for the lack of sufficient evidence that any drive of real importance was attempted toward Arab unity before the early years of the twentieth century, this

study shall take up the story from around 1905 with the publication in Paris of a book called Awakening of the Arab Nation in Turkish Asia by Naguib Azuri,<sup>7</sup> who himself was a Palestinian Arab. Indeed, there is considerable evidence to support the assumption that nothing of significance toward Arab unity was accomplished under Turkish rule which lasted for over four centuries. Hans E. Tutsch, writing concerning Arab unity, considers the Arab world as having been in a "state of hibernation" during the four centuries that Turkish rule dominated the Middle East. "Total night fell upon the Arab world," he claims, "about the same time as the lights of the Renaissance began to glow in Europe."<sup>8</sup> True it was that Turkish rule was such an imposing system upon the Arab world that seldom did any person ever go beyond the stages of dreams in developing schemes for Arab unity or independence.

Notwithstanding that this study dealt primarily with the more recent Arab movements toward unification, this study did, nevertheless attempt to cover the early attempts of the twentieth century in a survey fashion.

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<sup>7</sup>Naguib Azuri, Awakening of the Arab Nation in Turkish Asia cited by Francisco Gabrieli, The Arab Revival (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 51.

<sup>8</sup>Walter Z. Laqueur (ed.), The Middle East in Transition (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), pp. 12-13.



Thus in developing the plan for this study, the writer tried to identify the Arab people and their character; to survey the early attempts toward the development of an Arab nation; to look at some of the obstacles that were present to frustrate both past and present attempts toward unification; to trace, study, and to an extent, analyze the recent attempts at unity as they followed the tragedy of the war in Palestine, and finally to focus attention upon Nasser and the leadership of the United Arab Republic.

Though this study does not claim any prophetic words concerning Arab nationalism as it is now developing into a unifying force, it does attempt to penetrate into the minds of the Arab leaders of today. Moreover, special emphasis is placed upon the aims of President Nasser of Egypt as seen in his speeches, letters, recorded conversations, and reported acts.



## CHAPTER I

### ARABISM

#### I. WHAT IS AN ARAB?

What is an Arab? Perhaps the question is more complicated and calls for an even more detailed answer than the one which asks, what is an American? Since it is almost impossible to identify an American simply by ethnic or racial features, it is also a difficult task to identify an Arab by looking only for certain Semitic features. True, perhaps, that some Arabs may have similar physical features, but one is far from right if he assumes that all Arabs are dark or short or have long noses and dark eyes. A quick survey will reveal the dark type in Syria and Egypt, the almost Anglo-Saxon features in Iraq and Lebanon, and the fair complexions in Jordan and some parts of Lebanon.

The Arab states have within them a mixture of races and cultures. Though the Mohammedan religion is followed by the majority of the people living in the Arab countries, one can still find many people practicing other religions. Rabbi Elmer Burger, who visited the Middle East in 1955,

shows his surprise in his book, Who Know Better Must Say So,<sup>1</sup> that the Jewish community in Egypt was proud to identify itself with the Arabs. They, like many other groups who reside in Arab countries, consider themselves Arabs and nothing else.

Despite the fact that Islamic religion has never been a major factor in determining the citizenship of any Arab person, there are still many scholars, like Professor H. A. R. Gibb, who try to associate the Arabs with the Mohammedan culture and religion.<sup>2</sup> Yet Professor Gibb fails to explain why so many people in Arab states, who profess other religions than the Islamic faith, enjoy full citizenship, but without any hesitation consider themselves Arabs. Lebanon, for example, has a Christian majority, yet the people of Lebanon consider themselves as part and parcel of Arabism.

On the other hand, we must not neglect the influence of Islamic culture upon the laws, charters, constitutions, and traditions of some Arab states. Pakistan, for example, has a constitution based upon the Islamic tradition.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Elmer Burger, Who Knows Better Must Say So (New York: The Bookmiller, 1955).

<sup>2</sup>Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1954), p. 59.

<sup>3</sup>As this study progressed, the writer attempted to show that many newly-formed Arab states have defied traditions and forged ahead by changing some Islamic institutions into secular organizations.



Suffice it to say that, while there is no clean-cut definition of Arabism, and since the writer could not accept the definitions based on physical features or religion alone, the working definition adopted by some Arab leaders meeting in Baghdad a few years ago should provide us with a lead and a basis. "Those who live in Arab lands," the leaders decided, "speak the Arabic language, live an Arab way of life, and feel proud of being Arab, are Arabs."<sup>4</sup> This definition seemed to agree in principle with the practices of Arab countries. The writer was unable to find any literature that may contradict such a definition.

Since the Arab people are scattered over many geographical areas, it is hard to conceive that an Arab nation exists as we know it in Western circles. Yet the Arabs speak of a nation (in Arabic it is called "Umah"). To the Arab mind, the "Umah" is a part of the movement toward complete unity of all Arab states, and though it perhaps exists only in the minds of the Arabs, it is, nevertheless, real to them. In the division to follow, the writer has tried to establish whether the Arabs have the right to call themselves a nation.

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<sup>4</sup>Sands, op. cit., p. 9.

## II. AN ARAB NATION

Numerous studies have been made in the past which dealt with the subject of nationalism. Though many modern scholars, such as Hans Kohn, have tried to disentangle the idea of nationalism from the many myths that have surrounded it, we are still far from reaching a universally accepted definition. Kohn gave the following definition to nationalism, "...a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to the nation state." He then went on to describe the attributes of nationalism as a "deep attachment to one's native soil, to local traditions, and to established territorial authority."<sup>5</sup>

Ernest Renan, in his classic essay on nationality, paid less attention to the "relics" that have been associated with nationalism, such as geographical boundaries, common language, and religion. Although he saw some importance in considering the above mentioned factors, he nevertheless, also stressed psychological factors and environmental developments.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Hans Kohn, Nationalism, Its Meaning and History (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1955), p. 9.

<sup>6</sup>Ernest Renan, "What is Nationalism?" Readings in World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 285-290.



In interpreting the ideas of nationalism, Boyd C. Shafer defined the present concept as "(having) at least some unity of territory, a people with a common language, and an independent government (actual or hoped for)." Shafer added that the "devotion to this territory, these characteristics, this history, this government, we call nationalism."<sup>7</sup>

If we are to accept Shafer's definition (and this writer was inclined to do so), then truly the Arab people, having a common language, a common history, and common cultural characteristics, in every sense deserve to be called a nation.

It is true that, aside from the common language and characteristics, some of the Arab leaders in the past have tried to express Arab unity through Islamic concepts in order to achieve certain goals. The British government, realizing the power of Islamic teachings upon the Arabs, had hoped for a utilization of such a force in order to bring about a "Holy War" ("Jihad," in Arabic) against the Turkish Empire during World War I.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism: Interpreters and Interpretations, Publication Number 20 (Washington, D. C.: American Historical Association, 1959), pp. 2-3.

<sup>8</sup> The ideas of a Holy War were discussed in the correspondence between Sir McMahon and the Sherif of Mecca, (July, 1915 - March, 1916), British Command Paper #5964, Great Britain Foreign Office.



More recently, however, the trend has been for Arab states to depart from Islamic influences and adhere to more secular concepts. President Nasser of Egypt defined the new policy for the United Arab Republic toward the Arab nation in three short sentences. It should be noted that in his definition he said nothing of Islam or religion as a part of nationalism. His three sentences in defining the new nationalism were

1. Arab nationalism represents integrity and independence.
2. Arab nationalism represents dignity, construction, and the end of the age of stooges.
3. Arab dignity represents the end of occupation and exploitation.<sup>9</sup>

Yet President Nasser did not brush aside the other factors such as language and history. In addressing the United Nations General Assembly in 1960, he said, "We declare that we believe in one Arab nation which has always maintained unity of language, which is the unity of thought; and a unity of history, which is the unity of conscience."<sup>10</sup>

It is interesting to note here that recent Arab leaders, such as President Nasser, are beginning to think

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<sup>9</sup>United Arab Republic, Pocket Book, 1962 (Cairo, Egypt: Information Department, 1962), p. 20.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 20. (The writer understands that the term "conscience" as used by Nasser, refers to the heritage of the Arabic people.)

in terms of unity of language, thought, past history, and culture instead of religion simply as the pattern for the new Arab nationalism.

## CHAPTER II

### THE WESTERN IMPRESSION OF THE ARABS

To most people of the Western world, especially those who live in the United States, the Arab represents a romantic figure which is not too remote from the characters out of the pages of The Arabian Nights. Many are still under the impression that Arabs are wandering nomads with such titles as "Sheiks," "Pashas," or "Ameirs." This picture is far from the truth today. When the late President Sarmiento of the Argentina Republic compared the Arab horsemen and Bedouin to the gaucho of Argentina,<sup>1</sup> he had in mind only the Arabs of the Sahara Desert -- and those during the nineteenth century. Yet to many readers the impression formed by Sarmiento of the Arabs holds true today.

But much progress has been made in the Middle East during the last few years. It should be noted, however, that the press in the West has been unjust to the progress

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<sup>1</sup>D. F. Sarmiento, Life in the Argentina Republic In the Days of the Tyrants (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1960).



of Arab states by almost completely ignoring the attempts by the Arabs while emphasizing the progress of the state of Israel.<sup>2</sup>

It must also be remembered that the image of the Arabs as caravan-riding people, camel drivers, and tent dwellers is generally encouraged by religious literature which depicts the times of Christ. Elmer Burger, in astonishment concerning the real picture of the Arab lands, described his reaction to the camel caravans that he expected to see in the Arab lands upon visiting the Middle East. Said Dr. Burger, "We saw the longest camel caravan anywhere in the Middle East on the road out of Nazareth...in Israel."<sup>3</sup>

Moreover, accounts of the Middle East by European colonial agents have distorted the Western picture of the Arab. In his book The Road to Suez Erskine B. Childers traced the Western image of the Arab from the early Crusades to the present time. He drove home the fact that most impressions were brought to the West, especially to England, by soldiers such as Gordon (the British General who was killed in the Sudan) and Kitchener who made punitive expeditions

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<sup>2</sup>Alfred M. Lilienthal in his book There Goes the Middle East gave documentary proof concerning the partiality of the Western Press in relations to the Arab states. Also, the United Arab Republic Information Center in Washington has on file the records of various newspapers concerning prejudiced reporting - even distortion of facts.

<sup>3</sup>Burger, op. cit., p. 62.

to the Sudan. Mr. Childers also pointed out that what the soldiers saw was the "restive, angry, and degraded Arab."<sup>4</sup>

Lowell Thomas, Sr., in his desire to arouse American interest, revealed that even news commentators can influence the image of a people. Thomas saw the advantages of the romantic story as was developed by the "Sheik of Araby," the famous Lawrence of Arabia.<sup>5</sup> Somehow, the slides and lectures shown and given by Thomas survived all other attempts by informed persons to give the true picture of the emerging Arab states in the twentieth century.

One writer described the Western image of the Arabs as the picture of "glamour of the desert, of sheiks in flowing robes and golden head-gear with white silk keffiya hanging down; and the picture of Arabs as dirty, dishonest, and inferior."<sup>6</sup>

The desert image of the Arabs was called by Childers a "mirage" to the Western mind. He cited the fact that today in the Middle East there is a total population of almost 40

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<sup>4</sup>Erskine B. Childers, The Road to Suez (London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1962), pp. 45-46.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>6</sup>Caracatcus, Revolution in Iraq (London: Gallanzo Publishers, 1959), p. 26.



million. He estimated that around 8 million people live in large cities, while only 3.5 million Arabs are nomadic.<sup>7</sup>

The Western image of the Arabs should be seriously considered in the historical development of Arab nationalism. Since both England and the United States have been involved in the diplomatic affairs of Arab states during the past few years, the Arabs seem to feel that the public, both in England and America, has been purposely misinformed. Since public opinion in the West is a power within itself, especially at the polls, perhaps also the Western foreign policies have been directed toward the votes rather than the issues. The Arabs feel that they are in no position to tell the story to the Western public.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Childers, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

<sup>8</sup>Another example of the prejudiced attitude of the Western press, especially American papers, was investigated by this writer. The New York Herald Tribune printed a set of four articles by David Ben Gurion, the Premier of Israel. The articles were featured in a prominent place, and ran for four days, May 13 to 16, 1962. The articles featured several violent attacks on the Arab states and even the Islamic religion. Dr. Nofal, Assistant Secretary General of the Arab League, wrote an answer to the Ben Gurion articles. But the Herald Tribune refused to publish his answer and offered instead a space in the letter column for a short answer. It must also be noted here that the Arabs have no vast resources or influence in Western countries. The Arab communities in the United States and England are too small and ineffective to be used for political influence.



## CHAPTER III

### THE ROAD TO ARAB NATIONALISM

#### I. THE ARAB REVOLT

On June 12, 1916, the London Times featured a long article concerning the Arabs of Arabia and their struggles against the Turks in their efforts to free their country from Turkish domination. The announcement in the paper praised the courage of the Arabs who "never bowed their heads to Turkish control."<sup>1</sup> It seemed evident from the editor's point of view that, contrary to common belief at that time, the Arabs were not willing to accept the Turks simply because the Ottoman Empire professed the Islamic religion.

Though perhaps readers of the Times were hearing about the activities of the Arabs against the Turks for the first time, the British government, through Sir Henry McMahon, who was the British High Commissioner at Cairo, was already actively engaged in a series of correspondence with Hussein, the Sherif of Mecca, who was the self-appointed spokesman for the Arab people.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>"The Revolt of Islam," London Times, July 22, 1916.

<sup>2</sup>British White Papers, Command 5957 (released in 1939). (Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, and the Sherif of Mecca, July 1915-March 1916).

The correspondence between England and Mecca came as a result of many secret activities on the part of various Arab leaders (from Baghdad to Mecca) who attempted to take advantage of the international situation at that time by soliciting England's help against Turkish rule over their lands. Many of those Arab leaders saw the possibilities of the creation of an Arab state, fully united under Arab rule. Yet the British, who were representing the Entente powers, were not quite willing to go along at first in granting all the demands of the Arabs. Finally, however, Sir Henry McMahon wrote to Hussein assuring him that "concerning those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interest of her ally, France," he was empowered to give him the following assurances:

- (1) Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca.
- (2) Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognize their inviolability.
- (3) When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.
- (4) On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.



- (5) With regard to the "vilayats" of Baghdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognize that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special administrative arrangements in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local populations, and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.<sup>3</sup>

Again, on June 22, 1916, the London Times reported the revolt in Arabia as the outcome of the "pan-Arab movement, which arises at the ejection of the Turks from the Arabian peninsula, and the formation of a great confederation of Arab people."<sup>4</sup> At least on the surface, the English people were told that the Arab revolt in Arabia was designed to expel the Turks from Arab lands and to set up an Arab state under Arab leadership. The Arabs themselves, especially Sherif Hussein, evidently trusted the British to keep their two-fold promise.

The Prime Minister of England at the time of the Arab revolt, Lloyd George, reaffirmed again to the Arabs the intention of England to set up an independent Arab state upon the defeat of the Turkish forces. In a speech in Manchester on September 11, 1918, the Prime Minister

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>4</sup>"Arabia - Revolt Against Turkish Rule by Arabs," London Times, June 22, 1916.



said "It is the hope and desire of His Majesty's Government that the Arabic-speaking peoples ... should once more enjoy that liberty which will enable them to rebuild the edifice of civilization and prosperity."<sup>5</sup>

The contribution of the Arabs to the success of the revolt is not an object in this study, yet no one can deny the value of the help given to the British and their allies against the Turks by the various Arab groups. There is no evidence that any responsible person ever questioned the right of the Arabs to re-unite during the war years. The feeling prevalent was that the Arabs earned their independence and their right to form a nation.

In his book The Ideas of Arab Nationalism, Zaki Nuseibeh feels that the Arabs had a perfect right to establish themselves as an independent nation. If all other factors for unification were to be ignored, he states that the Arabs should be allowed to unite into a single nation as a reward for their contributions to the cause of Turkish defeat. He stresses the emotional side of the Arab point of view when he says in his book "...the living and inspiring history of the Arab Rebellion in 1916 was as worthy a title

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<sup>5</sup>"Mr. Lloyd George in Manchester," London Times, September 12, 1918.

deed as any to nationhood."<sup>6</sup> Yet, when the war came to an end, although the Arabs kept their part of the bargain with England, the victorious countries were not anxious to fulfill their part.

At the close of World War I there were still more assurances -- words but no actions. Late in 1918 the British Army Command issued a statement concerning the Arab states that were freed from Turkey. The statement reads:

The Entente Powers are determined that the Arab race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a nation in the world. This can only be achieved by the Arabs themselves uniting, and Great Britain and her allies will pursue a policy with the ultimate unity in view.<sup>7</sup>

Although the above statement, which was directed to King Hussein of the Hejaz by Lord Hogarth, may have been a comfort to some Arabs, a careful reading will show that the wording was strictly for the sake of diplomacy. Britain promised an Arab nation only if the Arabs would unite first. Since many of the Arabs outside Arabia proper were not interested in seeing unity under Hussein, the British were left free to act in secret with the French. King Hussein,

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<sup>6</sup>Zaki H. Nuseibah, The Ideas of Arab Nationalism (New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 54.

<sup>7</sup>Great Britain Foreign Office, Miscellaneous Paper Number 4, Command #5964, p. 3. (Released in 1939.)



to whom the British were indebted, did not seriously consider any Arab unity which was to exclude him as king over all Arabs. In other words, King Hussein preferred a disunited Arab world to a united Arab nation with some leader other than himself as its head.

Hogarth, who presented the British Army's statement in 1918 to Hussein, described his recollection of the king's attitude:

It is obvious that the king regards Arab unity as synonymous with his own kingship, and as a fair phrase unless so regarded. He treats our proclamations and exhortations about it as good intentions but no more. And he has no faith in their effect until we support the embodiment of the idea in one single personality--himself.<sup>8</sup>

Thus the British in 1918 finally adopted the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, which was based on diplomatic notes exchanged by England, France, and Russia. The notes completely ignored the ideas of Arab nationalism and divided the Arab lands into several territories under their jurisdictions. The Sykes-Picot exchanges took place in May, 1916, three months after the final Anglo-Arab agreement!<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>9</sup>Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1958), p. 30. (The final Anglo-Arab Agreement was based upon the last correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif of Mecca, as reported in the British White Papers, Command #5957, and discussed in the first part of this chapter.)



The Arab revolt achieved only one of its goals, the expulsion of Turkey from Arab lands. But the revolt did not bring about any Arab unification. Instead of an "Arab Nation" as promised by England, the Arab lands were divided into mandates and protectorates. To the Arab people, the result of their war efforts brought about only a change in masters.

The military occupation of the Arab lands by the French and the English, the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, the San Remo Conference in 1920, and the League of Nations decision concerning the establishment of mandates in 1922, contributed to the first major frustration toward Arab unity.<sup>10</sup>

## II. FROM DISAPPOINTMENT TO NEW HOPES

Though the post-war settlements by the members of the Entente concerning Arab lands were both frustrating and humiliating to the Arabs, the people of Arab lands never did abandon their hopes for eventual emancipation and unification. There were a few passionate attempts by Arab rebels to hold

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 36.

England to her pre-war promises, but such revolts were quickly put down, and the heat of the resistance to prevailing conditions cooled down.<sup>11</sup>

England and France, through their forces of occupation, slowly subdued any radical attempts by unhappy Arabs. Thus the Arab people, overcome by stronger forces and frustrated by the apathy of their own leaders who became satisfied with newly created districts under French and British control, once again learned to live with the new order. But the fire of nationalism that was kindled in the hearts of the Arabs during the Arab revolt was not to be completely put out. Yet very little was accomplished by the Arabs during the years that fell between the two world wars. It was not until the world was plunged into another war and the region of the Middle East was once again an important strategic area that the British began to think seriously about Arab unification.

To add to the irony of Arab frustration, the next attempt toward unity after World War I came years later, not from Arab circles, but from the British. On May 30,

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

1941, Sir Anthony Eden made a speech concerning the desire for unity of the various Arab states. Said Anthony Eden:

It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries and the political ties, too, should be strengthened. His Majesty's Government for their part will give her full support to any scheme that commands general approval.<sup>12</sup>

It should be noted that England's move toward nationalism and unity of the Arab states came about during a war period. It was obvious that the British government was interested in using Arab nationalism in order to counter Nazi propaganda material.

As the war pushed ahead, the Arabs were fearful of the German forces which were gradually gaining ground in Africa. There were no immediate responses to Eden's call for unity, except from Abdullah of Transjordan, who had a selfish plan which called for the annexation of Syria under his leadership.<sup>13</sup> The British, although passive toward Abdullah's scheme, were non-committal in their response.

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<sup>12</sup>Statement by Anthony Eden, London Times, May 30, 1941.

<sup>13</sup>Sayegh, op. cit., p. 118.



It was not until February, 1945, however, that a conference was held in Cairo to discuss the possibilities of Arab states working closer together in economic and political relations. The Arab states represented in the conference were Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. A covenant was signed, and the League of Arab States came into being.<sup>14</sup>

From the very beginning the League of Arab States was faced with the problem of unity. The representatives had to choose "between an organization representing all the Arab states but establishing looser ties among them" and "an organization in which fewer Arab states participated, but which was more compact and effective."<sup>15</sup> The Arab leaders, because of their jealousies and fears, accepted the first alternative.

Notwithstanding the elaborate structure of the League's charter, the League itself was never an effective

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<sup>14</sup>"The Arab States - Toward Unity," New York Times, September 20, 1949.

<sup>15</sup>Research Department, Introducing the League of Arab States (New York: Arab Information Center, June, 1962), p. 8.

instrument in bringing about political unity. The League was more successful in its social and economic attempts.<sup>16</sup>

The Secretary General of the Arab League, in his speech at Cornell University on November 5, 1960, perhaps described the Arab League in a true and objective fashion. He simply emphasized the fact that the League was merely an instrument used toward the attainment of Arab goals. He summarized the objective of the League by saying:

The Arab League is an instrument for self-betterment. It is an instrument for peace and security in our region. It is a step in the direction of complete political, economic, social, and cultural unity of the Arabs.<sup>17</sup>

The League of Arab States was severely tested when Palestine was about to be partitioned between the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine according to a United Nations decision.

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<sup>16</sup>The Arab League Information Office, 120 East 56 Street, New York 22, New York, has many pamphlets which describe the cooperation achieved between Arab states in the fields of medicine, welfare, trade, and cultural exchanges. One pamphlet, prepared by Dr. Abdel Rahim Omran, entitled "Public Health and Welfare in the Arab States," gives a survey of what has been accomplished in the above named areas. Moreover, in pooling their resources, the Arab states, through the offices of the Arab League, have been able to present a more rounded picture of their people and countries in Western capitals.

<sup>17</sup>Research Department, op. cit., p. 38.



In December of 1947 the Arab League met to decide on the Palestinian problem. Here again, the Arabs were divided by selfish interests. Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon advocated an all-out war against the Jews, and economic pressures to be applied against the backers of the United Nations plan for partition. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, however, advised caution. Saudi Arabia was vitally concerned with her oil production and oil markets that were closely related to the American economy. King Saud, to dispel any fears, issued a statement saying, "Our friendship with the United States is solid and well-established...We believe the United States made a mistake in the United Nations Palestine decision, but we hope the United States will correct the decision."<sup>18</sup>

The defeat of the Arab forces in Palestine is well known.<sup>19</sup> Yet the tragedy of that defeat served to kindle in the hearts of younger Arab leaders a desire for new unity based on emancipation of their own lands. It was in Palestine that Gamal Abdel Nasser saw the greed of kings and the

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<sup>18</sup>"Heads Together," Time Magazine, Volume 50 (December 22, 1944), pp. 35-36.

<sup>19</sup>The Arab forces that entered the country of Palestine to fight for the Palestinian Arabs, though superior in numbers to the Jewish forces, were ill-equipped and ill-trained. All their armies were trained by either British or French officers who in many cases commanded the troops during the major battles. The Egyptian forces were severely defeated owing to the defective arms that were purchased by ex-King Farouk from the British.



exploitation by the Arabs by bigger powers. It was also in Palestine that Nasser began to see the possibilities for a free Egypt and a free Arab land. Even during the battle, Nasser wrote, "...my feelings would jump suddenly across the battlefronts, across the frontiers to Egypt."<sup>20</sup> He was convinced that the defeats suffered by Arab forces in Palestine were caused by the lack of Arab unity and by inefficient Arab governments.

There is no doubt that the war in Palestine brought to the front in Arab circles a new breed of men who were willing to think in terms other than their own selfish interests. Though they may have been misguided at times, they were, nevertheless, a dedicated group. The Arab officers who saw action in Palestine, and who were betrayed by their leaders, had an important role to play in changing many regimes in Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt.

Perhaps many Arab officers who fought in Palestine shared the disappointed feelings of Nasser when he was besieged in Falouga. They all were hurt more by the political corruption in their own states than by the immediate military setbacks, though hard they were indeed.

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<sup>20</sup> Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cairo, Egypt: Dar Al Taaoum Printing), p. 12.

Nasser recalled his feelings during the siege and said:

The political circumstances prevailing in the capital (Cairo) from where we received our orders threw around them all a siege more effective and paralyzed us more than anything the enemy could do to us who lay in Falouga.<sup>20</sup>

Thus the road was paved for new attempts toward unification, and Egypt took the first step in that direction.

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 54.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR IN PALESTINE

As the Arabs began to count their losses after the failure of their armed forces in Palestine, it was apparant to many young men, especially the young officers of the Arab armies, that they were being used as political tools in the hands of their leaders. The corruption of Arab kings and presidents was brought to light by actual experiences in the battlefields. More and more, the Arabs began putting the blame for their failures upon their own leaders instead of blaming the European powers for all their troubles.

Not only were the officers of the Arab armies unhappy with their leaders, but the Arab intelligentsia was also becoming aware of the need for a change in the corrupt leadership. It was evident that Egypt could supply the new kind of honest leadership that was needed and it was easy to see why the attempts by the Egyptians to purify their country was watched by all Arab people. Egypt had been for a long time the hub of intellectual activity for the Arab world. Egypt had supplied Arab countries with engineers, doctors,



lawyers, teachers, and technical advisers.<sup>1</sup> Also, one must not neglect to mention the influence of Radio Cairo, which has been for a long time a very popular and convincing voice to many Arabs in various Arab states throughout the Middle East.

Thus when the young officers of Egypt staged their coup d'e'tat in 1952, the whole Arab world was watching.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the success of Nasser in his policy toward the Suez Canal and the arms purchase from Russia encouraged the revolutionary elements in other Arab states to move toward changes in their own governments.

The young Egyptian officers were quite aware of the impact that they were making upon the rest of the Arab states. From the very beginning the leaders of the Egyptian Revolution were thinking in terms of complete Arab unity and emancipation rather than Egyptian independence alone. No one was more aware of need for reforms in the Arab countries than the leader of the Egyptian Revolution himself, Gamal Abdul Nasser.

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<sup>1</sup>Anwar J. Chejne, "Egyptian Attitude Toward Pan-Arabism," Middle East Journal, Volume II (1957), p. 264.

<sup>2</sup>In 1952 a group of young Egyptian officers expelled the unpopular Farouk and set up a new revolutionary regime. Most of the officers that took part in the coup were veterans of the wars of Palestine.

Even while scheming against the Farouk regime, Nasser was thinking in terms of a greater revolution which was to remove corruption in all Arab states, destroy old regimes, and bring a final form of unity to all Arab lands under Egyptian leadership and guidance.

Nasser justified his goals for Arab unity by refusing to accept Egypt as an isolated country---isolated from the rest of the world. "If anybody tells me," he wrote, "that the place for us means this capital where we live, I differ with him. And if anyone tells me that place for us means the political boundaries of the country, I also differ."<sup>3</sup>

To Nasser the age of Arab isolation was gone forever. He viewed the Arab people as one body with minor local interests, but possessing unique historical and cultural backgrounds which will ultimately cement their minds into the formation of a single Arab nation. If Arab unity was to be achieved, then Egypt must be made the focal point in any attempt toward unification. Nasser was determined to make the Egyptian Revolution the starting point for Arab nationalism. "There is an Arab circle surrounding us,"

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<sup>3</sup>Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt's Liberation (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 84.



Nasser proclaimed, "(and) this circle is a part of us, and we are a part of it, our history inextricably part of its history."<sup>4</sup>

Nasser was also aware of the fact that there was no Arab state more qualified to supply leadership to the Arabs than Egypt. He saw the need of a "role of interaction with, and responsibility to"<sup>5</sup> the ideal and goals of all Arab people toward unification. There was no doubt in the mind of Nasser as to the country that should assume the role of leadership. After surveying the strength of Egypt in comparison to the rest of the Arab states, Nasser concluded, "We alone, by virtue of our place, can perform the role (of leadership)."<sup>6</sup>

The leaders of other Arab states have been anxious to eliminate the influence of Egypt. The King of Jordan clearly remembers with horror the chaos created in 1956 when the country was about to join the Baghdad Pact.<sup>7</sup> Iraq, which has long rivaled Egypt for Arab leadership, did not escape the importation of Egyptian revolutionary ideas.

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 114.

<sup>7</sup>The Baghdad Pact was a defensive military alliance which included England and other non-Arab states. Egypt did not want any alliances that were linked with non-Arab powers.

Even the tiny state of Lebanon was indirectly influenced by the events that had taken place in Egypt. In the summer of 1958 Lebanon was visited by a civil war, and at the request of the Lebanese government, the United States sent troops into the country. Some scholars feel that the intervention by the United States was primarily a move against Nasser's ambitions to unite the entire Arab states and thus control the Middle East.<sup>8</sup>

The Iraqi Revolution of 1958, in which the mobs killed the king and his prime minister, was greeted in Cairo and Damascus as an answer to the prayers of both capitals. The propaganda forces of Egypt finally achieved results.<sup>9</sup> Yet the leader of the revolution in Iraq, Abdul Karim Qasim, had ideas of his own. Qasim thought of himself as the sole leader of the Arab world. Iraq, under the leadership of Qasim, began to rival Egypt for Arab leadership. Qasim surrounded himself with Communist advisers. Iraq was to be isolated for a while from the rest of the Arab world. Then suddenly, in February of 1963, the rule of Qasim was brought to an abrupt end by Iraqi military officers who were friendly to the regime of Nasser.

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<sup>8</sup>George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (New York: Praeger University Press, 1960), p. 295.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 296.



There are no signs today that President Nasser has lessened his propaganda activity which, in part, is directed at establishing a unified Arab country. No visitor to the Middle East can ignore the popularity of Radio Cairo. Even in Saudi Arabia, where King Saud exercises full control over his people, the "souks" (market places) are filled with the voices of Nasser and his sermons concerning Arab unity.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>This observation was made during the writer's short stay in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabs are great admirers of the progress made in the United Arab Republic. The pictures of Nasser are found in many shops and homes. Although the soldiers of the King suppress any movements that are sympathetic with the ideas of Nasser, the Saudi Arab natives keep their radios tuned to Radio Cairo almost constantly. One prominent Saudi Arab leader, Prince Talal Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, the half brother of the reigning Saud, is very open in his friendliness toward Nasser of Egypt. Prince Talal differs from King Saud in his attitude toward Arab unity. Furthermore, Prince Talal is a favorite of the natives of Saudi Arabia. The Arab Observer, which is published in Cairo, Egypt, dedicated seven pages of its August 27, 1962, issue to the proclamation of Talal's ideas concerning corruption in Saudi Arabia and future emancipation of the country.

## CHAPTER V

### NASSER'S GRAND SCHEME

#### I. AN ARAB HERO

From the early days of the Egyptian Revolution, Gamal Abdul Nasser had two objectives in mind: to liberate Egypt from outside control and governmental corruption, and to unite the entire Arab world under his own leadership.

In reviewing the philosophy of his revolution, Nasser emphasized the decisive role that Egypt was to play in bringing about Arab unity. He saw the Arabs in different countries wandering around in search of a strong leader to guide them. He never did hide his feelings or try to conceal his ambition toward the establishment of a grand unified Arab state. "We, and only we," said Nasser, "are impelled by our environment and are capable of performing this role (of leadership)."<sup>1</sup>

Though Egypt, during the days that immediately followed the Revolution, did not embark upon any definite

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<sup>1</sup>Nasser, op. cit., p. 64.



policy of intervention in affairs of Arab states, it did support the cause of Arab unity by offering sympathy, technical help, and promises to ambitious Arab leaders in other Arab countries.<sup>2</sup>

In moving forward with his plans to liberate Egypt and unite the Arab states, Nasser received indirect help from strange quarters. The British, unwilling to make any move that may influence the rate of recovery at home, agreed with Nasser on October 9, 1954, to withdraw her troops from Egypt within twenty months. Though Britain may have been influenced by economic conditions, Nasser made sure that the Anglo-Egyptian arrangement was given wide publicity. The agreement for the departure of British troops from Egypt was hailed as a great victory for Nasser.<sup>3</sup> The Egyptians were proud that one of their own leaders was able to drive the British away. But equally proud of that fact were the rest of the Arabs who saw in Nasser a power that was able to challenge the British, get his demands, and keep his promises without sacrificing Arab principles or territory.

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<sup>2</sup>Mohammed Ghanem, "Changes in Egypt's International Position Over the Past Ten Years," Egyptian Political Science Review, July, 1962, p. 15.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

When President Nasser proclaimed the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, he gambled. But the gambling game was played also by the British and the French. The British and the French wanted to intervene, not so much to regain the Suez Canal as to tumble the revolutionary regime of President Nasser.<sup>4</sup>

The Suez Canal crisis and the attacks that followed disappointed both the British and the French. Instead of a broken Nasser, the British and the French saw a Nasser of great stature emerging from the Suez. Thanks to Russian promises and American pressure, Nasser was proclaimed by the Arab world as a great hero. The last-minute aggressive efforts by the British and the French were completely defeated.

In attempting to unite the Arab world, Nasser has often been misunderstood. The French Premier in 1956 compared Nasser's ambitions to those of Hitler.<sup>5</sup> Yet the comparison made by Premier Mollet was far from the truth. Nasser had no plans for world conquest, not even in his

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<sup>4</sup>Erskine B. Childers, The Road to Suez (London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1962), p. 211. (Nasser was hoping that moral pressure from England, France, and the United States would force the governments of England and France from reoccupying the Suez Canal by force. Though the British used troops and occupied the Suez territory, the occupation was short lived. Pressure from the United States and threats from Moscow caused the British to withdraw.)

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 214. (as quoted by Childers)



wildest dreams. It is not difficult to see why England and France were anxious to rid the Middle East of Nasser. Nasser has always been a threat to the Middle East policies of England and France. He was a reminder to the West that an Egyptian, who advocated Arab unity, was able to stand against the schemes of the Big Powers. For the first time in Arab history, an Arab leader had challenged the powers of France and England, and was able to come out of the struggle intact.

It is almost impossible for an objective student not to see some sincerity in Nasser's goals. His devotion to his country, his love of the Arab cause, and his love of the ideas of Arab unity should not be questioned. To Nasser, the role of Arab leadership has been placed upon him by existing circumstances. He does not feel that the leadership needed calls for "one individual or group of individuals," but for "a continuous and permanent one (leadership), where the individual is mortal."<sup>6</sup>

## II. EGYPT, NASSER, AND THE ARAB NATION

When the National Congress of Popular Powers proclaimed the charter of Egypt in June 30, 1962, Nasser saw to it that

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<sup>6</sup>The United Arab Republic Information Department, Ten Years of Progress and Development (Cairo: United Arab Republic, 1962), p. 6.

Egypt was identified with the Arab movement. After re-affirming social and individual rights, the Charter went on to read "we proclaim our people to be an integral part of the Arab nation."<sup>7</sup>

Nasser envisioned Egypt as a member of a united Arab nation--a nation that will be able to realize its place in history without compromise. Yet while Nasser was waiting for his dreams of an Arab nation to come true, he began to build Egypt as the center for unifying activities of all Arab states. He declared in one of his speeches, "The United Arab Republic is a strong base for Arab nationalism."<sup>8</sup>

Nasser's view of an "Arab nation" should not be misunderstood to mean a unified state formed by joining all Arabs under the leadership of one country and one leader. Though Nasser sees Egypt as a part of the Arab nation, he knows perfectly well that such a unified nation is not in existence. His ideas concerning the method for and meaning of Arab unity were expressed in an interview given to Dana Schmidt and correspondents from the New York Times on

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<sup>7</sup>Charter of the United Arab Republic, Cairo, Egypt.

<sup>8</sup>Speech delivered at Latakia, Syria, on December 14, 1960. The speech was officially translated and released by the United Arab Republic Information Center, Cairo, United Arab Republic.



November 3, 1959. When asked if he thought that Arab unity meant that Arab countries have to be unified into one country, President Nasser replied:

The constitutional forms represent a simple problem. Each country has the right to design its own bounds in connection with Arab unity. If certain countries wish to be unified with others, it is left entirely to such countries to decide on this. If an Arab country wishes to join a federal union with other countries, it is also left to them to decide on this. And if a country wishes to join a federal union with other countries, it is also left to them to decide on this. And if a country wishes to keep its own borders defined and clear and not merged into any other Arab countries, it is still left to it to decide.<sup>9</sup>

President Nasser, in the same interview mentioned above, made a clear definition of Arab unity. "Solidarity is the true expression of Arab unity," explained Nasser.<sup>10</sup> He also stressed the fact that there will be no Arab unity by force, and that he will never dictate the future of any Arab country.<sup>11</sup>

In achieving Arab unity, whether in a one-state form or in a loose federation, President Nasser insists that the Arabs must bring about such a unity by their own

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<sup>9</sup>Information Department, President Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews (Cairo: United Arab Republic, 1959), p. 595.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 602.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 595.

will and struggle. He feels that the Arabs made a mistake after World War I by putting their faith in the promises of the British government. "It is inconceivable," said Nasser, "that any major power would desire us (the Arab people) to achieve independence."<sup>12</sup>

According to Nasser, the greatest threat to Arab unity comes from imperialism and Zionism. Within the camp of imperialism the Egyptian President numbers all outside powers who have tried to exploit the Arab people for selfish reasons. International Zionism, as represented by the state of Israel, moves Nasser to think that the "Zionists always claimed that their holy state extends from the Nile to the Euphrates."<sup>13</sup> Nasser may be justified in his fears of Zionism when one remembers the attacks of Israel upon Egypt that resulted in the occupation of Egyptian territory by Israeli forces during the Suez Crisis in 1956.

Nasser's fear of British-French-Israeli aggression was shared by all Arabs following the Sinai episode. Both the British and the French, contrary to their official denials, were cooperating with the Israeli forces in combining their attacks against the forces and cities of the United

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 218.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 219.



Arab Republic. The attack on Egypt after the nationalization of the Suez Canal was a well-organized, three-power effort.<sup>14</sup>

### III. THE SYRIAN EXPERIMENT

The aggression against Egypt by the British-French-Israeli forces helped to encourage other Arab states to seek strength in unity. Syria sought to join Nasser in unity, and on February 5, 1958, Egypt and Syria agreed upon a seventeen-point program which was to lead the two nations into unity under the name of the United Arab Republic. The last point of the agreement made note of a plebiscite which was to take place on February 21, 1958. The proposed plebiscite was to decide the fate of the union and determine the choice of a president for the new United Arab Republic.<sup>15</sup>

The result of the plebiscite was a victory for Arab unity and also a partial fulfillment for the dreams of President Nasser. Nearly ninety-two per cent of the 7,415,173 votes cast were in favor of unity. The percentage of votes in favor of Nasser as the President of the United Arab

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<sup>14</sup>Childers, op. cit., p. 287.

<sup>15</sup>Official Press Release by the former Egyptian Mission to the United Nations, New York, February 6, 1958.

Republic was slightly higher.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, the Syrian vote was more pro-unity and pro-Nasser than the Egyptian vote.

The citizens of both Syria and Egypt welcomed the union of the two countries in the name of Arab unity. A provisional constitution was drafted and accepted on March 5, 1958. The Constitution, which bears the ideas of Nasser, declared in its first paragraph that "the United Arab State is a democratic, independent, sovereign Republic, and its people are part of the Arab Nation."<sup>17</sup>

Thus union between Syria and Egypt was a "first" between Arab states in modern times. It must also be remembered that this unity emanated from Syria and not from Egypt.<sup>18</sup> The desire for unity on the part of the Syrians came from the people by resolutions offered in the Syrian legislature. Furthermore, the Syrian people, in their move to unite with Egypt, actually projected their feelings and hoped for an eventual unification of all Arab states. The Syrian political parties, prior to the official union with Egypt, had passed a resolution which called upon the Syrian

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<sup>16</sup>International Review Service, Volume 10 (New York: United Nations, May, 1958), p. 42.

<sup>17</sup>Provisional Constitution of the United Arab Republic, Basic Documents of the Arab Unifications (New York: Arab Information Center, 1958), pp. 10-20.

<sup>18</sup>Sayegh, op. cit., p. 183.



people to approve a merger with Egypt in order to provide a "nucleus for an all-embracing Arab unity."<sup>19</sup>

Despite the enthusiasm shown by the Syrian people toward the United Arab Republic, the military leaders of Syria in September of 1961 broke away from Egypt and again established an independent Syria under a military regime. The disunion of the Republic was a definite setback to Arab hopes.

Yet the secession by Syria from the United Arab Republic should be understood as a move by the Syrian military leaders and not a popular move. It was a military group that broke away from Egypt. Secession was not brought about by a plebiscite.

In a speech to the Arab people on October 5, 1961, President Nasser expressed his disappointment. His words were, "I am following the development of events (disunion by Syria) with a broken heart."<sup>20</sup>

Nasser's actions were far from being rash. He again showed his concern for the Arab people. Although his military might was greater than that of Syria, he refused to shed Arab blood. It is revealing to quote some of the

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<sup>19</sup>Sayegh, op. cit., p. 186.

<sup>20</sup>Nasser's Speech to the Arab people, The Scribe, Volume III, No. 2 (Cairo: United Arab Republic), p. 14.

expressions of Nasser as disclosed by the speech mentioned above.

You knew a few days ago of my decision that Arab unity in Egypt and Syria must not be turned into a military operation. Accordingly, I stopped all military movements which had been started to support the enraged masses rising against the separatist movement in Syria.<sup>21</sup>

Nasser also re-affirmed his refusal to use any form of force by saying, "Today I declare to you that if I refused to use military operations as a means to consolidate unity, I now refuse to make civil war a substitute for it."<sup>22</sup>

Nasser's speech to the Arab people was concluded with a note of hope and continued aspiration for Arab unity.

My hope is freedom of both the Arab nation and the Arab citizen. I have faith in the inevitability of unity between the peoples of the Arab nation, as I have faith in life and the break of dawn, no matter how long the night. May God help beloved Syria, guide its footsteps, and bless its people. This United Arab Republic will remain, raising its flags high, singing its anthems and driving forward, with all its power, to build itself so that it may be a support for every Arab struggle, every Arab right, and every Arab aspiration.<sup>23</sup>

Perhaps by the Syrian episode the Arab people were able to learn from the experiment that Nasser, whatever he

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 19.



may be called by his enemies, was not a tyrant who wished to impose his will upon all Arabs by force.

#### IV. NASSER'S PRESENT ATTITUDE

President Nasser, disappointed by the dissidence of Damascus, began to direct more of his efforts toward Arab states which were still existing under feudal regimes. His targets were the states of Yemen, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. By supporting the revolutionary movements in Yemen, Nasser was successful in bringing about a change in the regime of that country. Early in 1963 Yemeni officers were able to overthrow the government that had dominated the country for some years and establish a more popular government that looked with favor toward the United Arab Republic.

Nasser did not neglect his own country while trying to help other Arab states achieve better forms of government. His main objective in his country was to make Egypt a model Arab state. Reforms have been under way in many areas of Egyptian life. Of special interest to the majority of Egyptians were the Agrarian Reform Law of 1952 and the subsequent acts which dealt with land. The Reform Law and the various agrarian acts, which broke up the large

estates that were held by a few families, allowed Egyptian farmers to own their own farming lands.<sup>24</sup>

Egypt has also made strides in other fields of interest to themselves and Arabs elsewhere. The High Dam is now about to be completed, and the Suez Canal Authority, aside from keeping the canal in excellent condition for navigation, launched in 1961 the first ocean-going ship ever to be built in the Middle East. Other ships are now under construction in Egyptian shipyards.<sup>25</sup>

The political atmosphere in the United Arab Republic (as compared to Iraq) was not influenced by Russian thought as the result of the arms purchase from the Russian block. Nasser was wise in training most of his specialists and military men outside the country. Even the pilots that were to fly the Russian jets were trained in European countries, thus keeping Russian and Communist advisers from flooding Egypt. Thus by building his armed forces and by increasing his industrial might, Nasser hopes to persuade other Arab countries to see their own possibilities and join in a common front of "solidarity."

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<sup>24</sup>Information Department, Agrarian Reforms in the United Arab Republic (Cairo: United Arab Republic, 1962), pp. 2-3.

<sup>25</sup>Information Department, The Suez Canal (Cairo: United Arab Republic, 1962), p. 3.



Nasser feels that with the United Arab Republic guiding the way by setting a progressive example other Arab states, especially Jordan and Saudi Arabia, will soon destroy their present governments and either join in a loose federation or become a part of a strong, centralized Arab unit.

The Arab Observer quoted the half-brother of King Saud as describing an explosive situation in Jordan. Prince Abdul Aziz spoke of "secret organizations, consisting of free Jordanians," who are already making plans to "close their ranks as the prelude to revolt."<sup>26</sup> Nasser watches closely the activities of such revolutionary organizations. To the credit of Nasser, one should add that he is a very patient man. Time seems to be on his side.

In Saudi Arabia, where King Saud at present enjoys the rights of feudal lords in all their glory, the political situation is even more unstable than it is in the tiny state of Jordan. Despite the oil wealth of the country, the common man receives little benefit from the country's riches. To add to the sensitive position of the king in Saudi Arabia, many of his half-brothers have left the country and are now in Lebanon and the United Arab Republic, where they are boldly speaking against his corrupt control.

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<sup>26</sup> Abdul Muhssen Abdul Aziz, "Towards Freedom," Arab Observer, November 26, 1962, pp. 21-24.

Nasser expressed his policy toward the rest of the Arab states that have not emerged from dynastic control by claiming that Egypt must stand ready to be at the "disposal of every Arab citizen."<sup>27</sup> He summed up his ideas in the following paragraphs.

In this sphere (helping other Arab states toward independence), the United Arab Republic should take care not to become involved in the local party disputes in any Arab states. This would place the call for unity and its principles beneath its level.

If the United Arab Republic feels that it is her bounden duty to support every popular, national movement, this support must remain within the framework of the basic principles, leaving the maneuvers of the struggle to the local elements to rally the national potentialities and drive the struggle towards its end in conformity with the local process of development and potentialities.

The United Arab Republic is, therefore, required to open new vistas for cooperation between all the nationalist progressive movements in the Arab world. She is required to react intellectually with them for the benefit of the common experience. However, she cannot impose on them a precise form for revolution.

The establishment of a union between the nationalist popular progressive movements in the Arab World will impose itself on the coming stages of the struggle.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>The United Arab Republic Information Department, The Charter (Cairo: United Arab Republic, 1962), p. 90.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., pp. 90-91.



## CHAPTER VI

### THE WEST LOOKS AT NASSER

Nasser and his nationalistic ideas have not always been understood by Western observers. Not only were the Western diplomats confused as to the acceptance of Nasser and his schemes, but the Western press added to the misunderstanding of Nasser by deliberate attacks and misrepresentation. Freda Utley, in the book Will the Middle East go West?<sup>1</sup> described the attitude of many news correspondents who wrote for American newspapers, in particular the New York Times, as being unacquainted with the aims of Nasser, especially in his nationalization of the Suez Canal. Freda Utley reported that Western newspapermen, ignorant of the facts and filled with prejudice, called Nasser such names as "an unscrupulous dictator backed and actively supported by Moscow," and "an Arab Hitler."<sup>2</sup>

Other information agencies, aside from newspapers, also played a part in crusading against Nasser without fully understanding his goals and theories. Erskine B. Childers,

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<sup>1</sup>Freda Utley, Will the Middle East go West? (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1957).

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 75.

the British historian, mentions an incident where an American television network deliberately dubbed into the sound track of an interview made in Cairo with President Nasser harsh voices that made Nasser look like a rebel-rousing leader. The interview, which was granted to an American correspondent in Cairo, was filmed with Nasser, in civilian clothes, seated in his office and talking in normal tones. Yet when the film was shown to American viewers, Nasser was in his military uniform, shouting at crowds of angry people.<sup>3</sup>

Western diplomats also varied in their evaluation of Nasser and his ambitions. Anthony Eden, writing in his Memoirs, tried to convey the idea that his fears of Nasser's scheme were primarily based upon the theory that Nasser resembled Hitler in his activities. In defending the Anglo-Egyptian agreement which brought about the evacuation of British troops from Egypt, Eden said that the agreement "seemed to our advantage and worth a trial."<sup>4</sup> But later on he compared the book written by Nasser, which was entitled The Philosophy of the Revolution, to Hitler's Mein Kampf. Despite the comparison made, Eden did not seem to be well acquainted with Nasser or his book.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Childers, op. cit., p. 106.

<sup>4</sup>Anthony Eden, Memoirs - Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960), p. 260.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 543.



If Eden was doubting Nasser's goals, he was not the only European power that did so. Prime Minister Mollet of France shared the feelings of Eden. How the French Prime Minister also compared Nasser to Hitler has already been mentioned in this study.

On the other side of the Atlantic the only power able to exert pressure upon Nasser was guided by the late Secretary of State Dulles. There is wide speculation among scholars as to the real motives behind the refusal of Dulles to honor the American agreement with Egypt to finance the Aswan Dam. Even the semi-official biographer of Dulles, John R. Beals, did not seem to know the real reasons behind Dulles' moves. When Beals wrote that Dulles refused the funds because he believed "that it would expose the shallow character of Russia's economic pretensions,"<sup>6</sup> Dulles was quick to deny that statement.

Yet Nasser found a more understanding political leader in the person of Senator Fulbright. In his speech to the Senate on August 14, 1957, Fulbright denounced Dulles as a secretary who "did not recognize that Egyptian nationalism was a powerful force which could, if recognized, ...be directed toward political freedom instead of communism."<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Utley, op. cit., (as cited by Utley, p. 93).

<sup>7</sup>Utley, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

President John F. Kennedy, on May 11, 1961, wrote a letter to President Nasser in which he assured the Egyptian President of the United States' interest in the welfare of the Middle East. Though the tone of the letter was diplomatic, the President of the United States recognized the possibility of Arab unification, even under the leadership of Nasser.

Said Mr. Kennedy:

I am proud of the tangible encouragement which has been accorded by our Government and people to the aspirations of you and your countrymen in the past, particularly during the critical days of 1956. The United States Government, itself the product of a union of several independent states, was pleased to recognize the formation of the United Arab Republic on February 22, 1958, the birthday anniversary of our first president, Washington.<sup>8</sup>

It is interesting to note that, although President Kennedy did not come out in support of Arab unification under Nasser, his reference to the United Arab Republic, and his comparison of the Arab states to the American states in their struggle for unity and independence, must be accepted as at least a passive attitude on the part of Washington, if not a favorable one.

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<sup>8</sup>Information Department, correspondence exchanged between President Gamal Abdel Nasser and President John F. Kennedy on the subject of the Palestinian problem (Cairo: United Arab Republic, 1961), p. 5.



## CONCLUSION

President Gamal Abdel Nasser is a military man. As a member of the young Egyptian officers group he was discontented with the social and political life of Egypt prior to the 1952 coup d'etat. The young officers of Egypt felt that, since the political parties of their country were occupied in their "squabbles" and the British were ruling through indirect methods, the armed forces had the right to intervene in the political life of Egypt. As long as the leaders of the political parties of Egypt were unable to bring about political stability, the outside powers took advantage of the internal situation. Nasser's aims in the Egyptian Revolution were also the aims of most Egyptian officers - nationalism, political reform, and social reorganization.<sup>1</sup>

Nasser, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, was able to bring about a change in the previously corrupt political climate, strengthen the cause of Arab unity by using the theme of nationalism for Arab support, and bring about social reform through the steps that were taken by the agrarian laws that were passed. A change in attitude

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<sup>1</sup>Monroe Berger, The Arab World Today (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Incorporated, 1962), pp. 396-397.

by the Egyptian people toward such social changes was an even greater accomplishment of the regime of Nasser. The people of the United Arab Republic are being trained to think in terms of long-range, industrial appreciation.<sup>2</sup> The national tempo has been increased in order to stimulate desire for education, social reform, and industrialization.

Though military revolutions in the past have come under harsh criticism, there have been few studies made to indicate that the social reforms introduced by the military groups have not been effective. Monroe Berger, who has spent much of his time in the study of social changes, sees the possibility that new ideas and techniques may in some cases be best introduced by military regimes.<sup>3</sup> In Egypt, during the past ten years, social reforms have been introduced by the military group now in power without harmful effects.

President Nasser, though at the present time playing the role of a civilian president, has never been able to escape his authoritarian environment. During the meeting of the National Congress of Popular Powers in May of 1962, President Nasser personally replied to all comments and proposals made by the elected members. Though some people

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 412.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 413.



may criticize his control over the legislative groups, a closer study of Nasser's speeches to the members of the National Congress of Popular Powers will reveal a need for such control.

It seems that on one occasion the delegates were excessive in their cheering. Perhaps enthusiastic over the fact that they, the people of Egypt, were having some of their liberties restored, they were honoring President Nasser by constant cheering. President Nasser took the delegates to task and reminded them that "no one has come here to cheer." He also criticized the members for making lengthy speeches in praise of his accomplishments.<sup>4</sup>

Perhaps the need for a strong man to guide the political life and social changes in a country, especially in Egypt, is best illustrated in the areas of customs and morality. Commenting on the remarks made by Sheik Mohammed El-Ghazali, in which the religious leader spoke of women's dress and appearance, the President of the United Arab Republic replied specifically to a point concerning covered arms and legs. Said the President:

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<sup>4</sup>Information Department, Arab Political Encyclopedia (Cairo: United Arab Republic, 1962), p. 52.

I think this is the men's responsibility since it is they who allow it. We say that men are responsible for the women. The men pay for the new fashions every year. This should be stopped. The Government cannot do anything in this respect; it is up to the head of the family to act.<sup>5</sup>

If a social reform is to take hold in the United Arab Republic, then a strong hand, such as that of Nasser and his supporters, must be able to guide the way in the face of ignorance, poverty, and prejudices that are so deeply rooted in the lives of the people. Furthermore, a strong military role is especially needed in the United Arab Republic to eliminate the problem of over-population. Defying religious fanatics, president Nasser has been able to establish health clinics throughout Egypt in order to educate young women in the use of new scientific methods for birth control.

While the role of the political and social reformer was obviously well played by Nasser, hopes for Arab unification under his leadership were also strengthened. As pointed out above, Nasser had always equated Egyptian progress with Arab nationalism, and it was in this area that most of the criticism directed against Nasser came to the attention of the world. Other Arabs who were

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 54.



jealous of Nasser,<sup>6</sup> Israel's propoganda machine the motive force of which was fear, British and French apprehensions toward any Arab unity, and the general "Arabphobia" that existed in certain areas of the world all combined to put Nasser in frequently embarrassing positions.

Nasser, to build faith in his revolution and overcome the criticism that may have been directed against him, sought to strengthen his armed forces and striking power. It was not so much the fear of Israel as an aggressor that forced Nasser to build vigorously his armed forces as much as his desire to put faith and hope in the hearts of all Arabs. Whether or not his aims were wholly selfish (and the writer seriously doubts that they were), Nasser has been able to inspire the people of Arab countries. Though this writer cannot pass a value judgment on the means used by Nasser in his accomplishments, the fact still remains that he was able to raise Arab nationalism to a new level. Those Arab people who suffered defeat during the wars of Palestine will accept only a strong show of military force. Nothing else will do.

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<sup>6</sup>Not all Arab leaders accepted Nasser. Although many Arabs admired the progress made under Nasser's administration, the leaders of smaller Arab states, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, afraid of his ability to expose their corruption, worked to counter his nationalistic concepts. Also, such leaders as Quasim of Iraq were aspiring for Arab leadership themselves.

During the month of July, 1962, the United Arab Republic was able to launch two types of long-range rockets. The accomplishment was hailed by many Arabs as a great stride toward Arab nationalism. Even in Syria, where the administration was still unfriendly toward Nasser, the Syrian Prime Minister said, "We are proud of the new weapon."<sup>7</sup> The London Daily Telegraph declared that "reactions throughout the Arab world yesterday show Egyptian prestige as soaring after Saturday's successful demonstration of rocket firing."<sup>8</sup>

Nasser saw a definite place for the army in the organization of the political and social life of the United Arab Republic. He saw the army not merely as "barracks" but as a "university with open doors to teach the people, to strengthen their bodies, and to help raise their morale."<sup>9</sup> Political observers of the Arab world may well agree with Nasser in his estimation of the role of the army in shaping social and political institutions. No one should underestimate the military in the life of the Arabs.

The designs for Arab nationalism as they emerge from Cairo may be better understood as one comes to understand

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<sup>7</sup>"World Greet 'Conqueror'," Arab Observer, July 30, 1962.

<sup>8</sup>Daily Telegraph as quoted in Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>9</sup>Berger, op. cit., p. 402.



better the complex attitudes of the Arabs. The people of the Arab world may disagree as to methods for unity, but they look with favor toward progress in communication, industry, and social reform made by Nasser and his regime.

Whether Nasser is honest in his approach toward Arab unity and is a true believer in democratic ideals is not a question that can be answered very easily. It must be pointed out, however, that perhaps there are a few inconsistencies in Nasser's grand design for Arab unity. Although Nasser had indicated in the past that no force will be applied to insure Arab unification, reports from Yemen and Jordan have proved the contrary. Egyptian specialists have been reported to be actively training rebels in various Arab countries. Yet to the supporters of Nasser his tactics may be justified as the only means for doing away with old dynasties and corrupt, unpopular regimes. Supporters of Nasser may also point to the fact that, although Yemeni rebels were given military aid from the United Arab Republic, as soon as the Yemeni regime was established Nasser did not force the newly independent state to become a part of the United Arab Republic.

One thing should be said at this concluding stage. If Nasser is not good for all men everywhere, he is good for the Arabs and for Arab nationalism. The Arabs who desire

progress along with unity, admire the work of Nasser and they are ready to join hands with him in order to bring about complete Arab unification.

There remains in the mind of observers a very puzzling question, "Nasser, what next?" The writer would be very naive to utter any prophetic words concerning Nasser. Yet there seem several possible roads for Nasser to take in shaping his plans for complete Arab unification. Nasser, for example, may turn to the East and ally himself with communism, but even the most radical enemies of Nasser do not dream of such a move. The teachings of the Mohammedan religion will by themselves neutralize the effects of Communism. Nasser's reactions to communist followers in the United Arab Republic are well known--the Egyptian jails are filled with communists.

Will Nasser go to the West completely? That is a very doubtful move. Nasser, though not embittered over the Suez Crisis to the point of hopelessness, does not trust the West. Perhaps one should take Nasser seriously when he speaks of non-alignment in international relations as the policy of the United Arab Republic. The United Arab Republic, like other Asian and African states, does not want to be involved in the East-West struggle, though perhaps it would like to share in the possible benefits of such a struggle.



Nasser's next move may be a step in the direction of his ultimate goal--complete unification for all Arab states. Here, his methods should not vary greatly from his past actions. Nasser may continue to support the rebels of other Arab states, especially of Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Once they have been "liberated" from their existing unpopular governments, Nasser will have at his disposal the population, land, and oil of the Middle East. In the final analysis it remains to be seen whether Nasser will use the resources of a unified Arab state to strengthen the lot of the Arabs or if he will use such a force to become a virtual dictator. If we were to judge by words and previous actions of Nasser, then the latter alternative seems to be highly improbable. But who knows the mind of a man when he obtains power?

The final chapter in Arab unification has not been written. It will not be written in the next few days. The Arab world today is going through a difficult period of transition, and the road toward unification is still filled with unsolved problems, but if the past few years are any indication of what is to follow, then one should not put a unified Arab state in the category of dreams. The seeds that Nasser is planting today by raising his people to higher standards and by securing a place for them in the economy of world politics will be the determining factors in the final act for Arab unification.

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